Genomics can transform the NHS – but not at the cost of our national security
4 min read
As someone who spent most of my career in the NHS and wider healthcare system before entering Parliament, I have seen first-hand the extraordinary potential of early diagnosis and personalised treatment.
The NHS’s new 10-Year Plan includes a £650m initiative to map the genome of every newborn baby in the UK. If delivered safely and ethically, this could be one of the most transformative advances in public health in decades. It would help detect rare conditions early, tailor treatments more precisely, and improve outcomes from the very start of life.
Genomic science, alongside artificial intelligence, has the potential to ease pressure on frontline services, by shifting our system from reactive to preventative care. I believe strongly that technology will be central to building a more productive and resilient NHS. But it must be introduced properly, fairly, and above all, securely.
That last point cannot be overstated. For all the promise this initiative holds, it raises serious ethical and national security concerns. Who will have access to this data? Where will it be stored? And who will be permitted to work on the programme?
The Conservative Party has been clear: foreign-controlled companies, particularly those linked to authoritarian regimes, must not be involved in any part of this project. That includes sequencing, data analysis, software, cloud infrastructure and research access.
In Parliament, I work closely with organisations that assess the influence of hostile states, including China, Russia and Iran. I am also a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China.
Companies like the Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI) Group, though presenting as scientific institutions, operate in jurisdictions where the line between state and private sector is blurred. BGI’s main bases in Shenzhen and Hong Kong are now fully under Beijing’s control, following the 2020 National Security Law.
The idea that the DNA of every British baby could be accessed by a foreign government is deeply troubling
Several of its subsidiaries have already been sanctioned by the United States over allegations of surveillance, data misuse, and links to the Chinese military. There is no doubt that China views global genomic data as a strategic asset – something to acquire, analyse and potentially exploit.
We cannot ignore this risk. Genomic data is the most personal information an individual can possess. Once compromised, it cannot be reset or recovered. The idea that the DNA of every British baby could be accessed by a foreign government is deeply troubling and completely unacceptable.
Unfortunately, the government’s record on China does little to reassure. The long-delayed ‘China Audit’, published more than a year after it was announced, offered little substance. It spoke warmly of China’s status as our third-largest trading partner and noted its presence in UK universities, but said almost nothing about the national security implications of those ties. Nor did it mention that a number of British parliamentarians remain under Chinese sanctions.
This is not good enough. The government must take a clear and robust position. Only UK-based institutions, or those from trusted allied countries, should be permitted to take part in this programme. The public deserves full transparency: who is involved, where data is stored, and what safeguards are in place.
I say this as someone who believes deeply in the power of technology to improve our NHS. AI can help with diagnostics, triage and planning – but it must be implemented in a way that is inclusive and fair. I am especially concerned about how these changes affect older people and those with disabilities, many of whom already struggle with online systems. Innovation must never come at the cost of accessibility.
The newborn genome initiative has the potential to put Britain at the forefront of medical research, but we must not let enthusiasm override caution. This programme must rest on strong ethics, democratic oversight and clear legal protections. We cannot afford to get it wrong.
Handled correctly, this work could improve thousands of lives, but only if we keep it secure, transparent and entirely under the control of those who share our values.
Gregory Stafford is the Conservative MP for Farnham and Bordon, member of Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China and of the Health and Social Care Select Committee
