If Britain wants better mobile coverage, policy must encourage cooperation, not conflict
4 min read
Britain has a mobile connectivity problem.
Despite years of reform and promises of improvement, businesses and households still face patchy coverage, unreliable signal and mobile not-spots. Networks that deliver connectivity are built through thousands of rental agreements between operators and the farmers, businesses, charities, churches, local authorities and public bodies that host telecoms infrastructure. Better coverage means more mast sites, as Ofcom itself recognises, to tackle local coverage gaps and meet growing demand.
Yet nearly one in five existing mast hosts now face “renegotiation” of their rental agreements under a coercive framework that empowers operators to boost their profits by slashing rents paid for sites. Instead of stimulating the supply required, this is generating more legal disputes in nine years than in the previous three decades combined. Without willing site providers, there are no mast sites. Without mast sites, there is no connectivity.
How did we get here? The previous government replaced market-based rental valuations with a framework specifically designed to reduce operator costs and, it was supposed, accelerate rollout. However, subsequent events bear out warnings at the time that the unilateral powers given to operators and infrastructure builders, in particular, simply to impose drastic rent reductions on site providers, and then use the results as comparables, have turned previously cooperative relationships adversarial.
No one disputes the power imbalance between operators and site owners, but not only have Ministers chosen to ignore the evidence of the resulting negative sentiment among site owners towards hosting mobile infrastructure, but they are actually making it worse.
When Parliament passed the PSTI Act, it included Section 70, which was designed to provide an independent escalation route when disputes arise and allow consideration of operator conduct. Yet section 70 remains unimplemented.
Most regulatory frameworks that grant significant statutory powers also provide a mechanism for complaints, dispute resolution and independent oversight. The Electronic Communications Code stands largely alone in lacking such safeguards. Not only do site owners face coercive strategies, but they do not even have an independent mechanism to call out the operators’ tactics.
Meanwhile, operators, engaging land agents as their enforcers, threaten site-owners with the Act’s performative dispute mechanism backed with court action, which they know site-owners can neither afford nor win – yet some refuse to be coerced. I have direct experience of a family farm where this is playing out currently, and I have met others in the same situation.
Poor connectivity comes at a substantial cost. The UK ranks 61st in the world for mobile performance, with London reportedly the worst-connected major European city. According to the Centre for British Progress, poor connectivity costs the economy around £785 million a year - lost productivity, delayed investment and businesses that cannot rely on a basic service.
That is precisely the lesson of the UK's experience since the Electronic Communications Code was reformed in 2017. Yet rather than pause and assess whether the framework is working, the Government chose to extend it to thousands more sites through the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act- expanding the stick, while leaving the safeguards on the shelf.
The scale of this is significant. FOI figures from DSIT confirm between 12 per cent and 18 per cent of existing agreements will be affected - meaning nearly one in five mast hosts face renegotiation under a framework already proven deeply contentious. As a result, Notices to Quit (NTQs) from site providers to dismantle mobile infrastructure from their properties for redevelopment purposes are booming to the extent that Virgin Media O2 recently announced they are losing sites in London at a faster pace than they can be replaced.
What is needed? First, a proper review is needed on the impact of the code and, in particular, a more balanced rental valuation method, so that the interests of operators and site providers are ultimately aligned. Good regulation should reinforce that, not undermine it. Better conduct and fairer distribution of value means fewer disputes. Fewer disputes mean fewer NTQs and faster deployment. Fewer NTQs and faster deployment mean better coverage. Second, by establishing a formal role in considering complaints where operators fail to comply with the industry’s Code of Practice, Section 70 would create at least an independent escalation route when disputes arise.
Britain does not need to choose between connectivity and fairness. Faster rollout and better relationships are complementary, not competing objectives. The Government should restore a better balance of power between site-owners and operators, commence Section 70 immediately and review - through an evidence-based impact assessment - whether the post-2017 framework is delivering the cooperation, investment, network deployment and connectivity improvements it was originally designed to achieve.
Britain's connectivity challenge will not be solved through confrontation. It will be solved when policy once again encourages partnership.
