Trump’s Iran war has changed geopolitics – but not in the way that he and Netanyahu had hoped
Trump meets Netanyahu in Washington in February 2026 (Xinhua/Alamy)
4 min read
Wars are much easier to start than to end. That is a hard truth, which a generation of politicians and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic learned from our wars of choice in Iraq and Afghanistan.
President Donald Trump overlooked that lesson when he and Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu gambled that a short, sharp war against Iran would bring the regime down and fundamentally change the balance of power in the Middle East.
Trump’s war certainly has shifted the balance, but not in the way he planned. Iran sustained major damage to its military capability and its infrastructure in the intensive US-Israeli bombing campaign that began on 28 February. But the regime survived and demonstrated that it holds two powerful strategic levers: the power to close the Strait of Hormuz in ways which are very difficult to counter; and the capability to damage the vast petrochemical facilities in the Gulf states with relatively unsophisticated weapons.
The recent resumption of strikes between Israel and Iran are a reminder that there is another dimension to the conflict. There will be no US-Iran settlement without a durable ceasefire in Lebanon. Trump has several times berated Netanyahu to stop him bombing Beirut. But the fact is that the Americans have not paid sufficient attention to the Israeli military thrust deep into Southern Lebanon and the destabilising effect it is having on the prospects of a settlement with Iran.
Trump is desperate to end the war he started. He is faced with an increasingly hostile domestic reaction as prices rise. The Republicans in Congress are getting restive as the midterm elections approach. But the President cannot just walk away as he did from the Ukraine peace talks. To avoid a complete humiliation, he also needs to get the Strait open.
The new hardline Iranian leadership know that the US cannot afford a long stalemate while they block the Strait, with all the implications of that for the global economy. They are therefore playing hard ball. But they too need a deal. The US blockade of their ports is worsening their economic plight. They badly need access to their sanctioned assets.
In other words, the conditions exist for a negotiated outcome. Leaks suggest that the US and Iran are closing in on a 60-day deal This would involve Iran reopening the Strait with no tolls in return for the US lifting its blockade and allowing Iran to sell its oil. Tehran would commit to never developing a nuclear weapon (that has always been their public position). There would be further negotiations on a longer-term nuclear agreement which would involve Iran disposing of its stock of highly enriched uranium. Any such deal would probably look much like the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which Obama accepted and Trump rejected.
The Gulf states... have some hard thinking to do about their alliances
An interim deal will also have to cover an end to the fighting in Lebanon. This is where sustained top-level US diplomacy will be needed to convince the Israeli government that their security interests will be best served by a negotiated settlement in Lebanon, backed by US guarantees. The Iranians will also need to be persuaded that as part of a deal they must do the heavy lifting in Beirut to rein in Hezbollah.
Trump will proclaim any reopening of the Strait as a famous victory. There will be huge relief around the world. But in strategic terms, the lasting effect of Trump’s war will be to highlight the strength of Iran’s regional position. Long after the US armada has sailed home, Iran will continue to dominate the Strait. The Gulf states have found that they are acutely vulnerable and will have some hard thinking to do about their alliances and their future relationship with Iran. And Israel will need to ponder its increasingly fractious relationship with its American ally.
Wars are not only hard to end. They also change geopolitical realities.
Lord Ricketts is a crossbench peer and former national security adviser
