Caught between Trump and the EU, Starmer must perform a tricky balancing act
Keir Starmer and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen (Alexi / Alamy Stock Photo)
4 min read
There was a chapter in the 2024 Labour manifesto called “Britain reconnected” which set out its plans for a reset with the EU, singling out France and Germany as allies with whom relationships needed to be rebuilt.
In the preceding paragraph came the lauding of the “special relationship” with the US as one that “transcends whatever political parties and individuals are in office” (a clear hedge against the then-forthcoming US election) and expressed a determination to work together on the basis of “shared values and common interests”.
Had Joe Biden or Kamala Harris emerged as the victor that November, none of this would have been particularly problematic. The Biden administration was clear that Brexit was a mistake and would have been cheering on the reset from the sidelines. But the election of Donald Trump changed all that.
An EU reset that sees the UK dynamically align with EU veterinary standards could cause Trump to lash out at the UK
Trump has always made clear that, even if and when he gets on with individual European leaders like Giorgia Meloni, Emmanuel Macron or Viktor Orbán, he intensely dislikes the European Union as an institution and it’s hard to discern many shared values or common interests either with the UK or the EU. In February he told reporters that the EU was “formed to screw the United States”. And he has made no secret of both his dislike of European unwillingness to spend on defence and what he sees as European protectionism, whether in the tariffs they levy on US imports or the regulations they impose on US goods and services looking to sell or operate inside the single market.
Trump’s actions have given a new impetus to the UK-Europe reset but also introduced a new level of jeopardy.
The impetus comes from the realisation that European defence is no longer safe in US hands. That means spending more – much more – than most of western Europe was planning. On the night it became clear that he would be Germany’s next chancellor, Friedrich Merz shocked the post-election “elephant round” of party leaders by saying that the US had to now be regarded as “indifferent” to the interests of Europe. The EU has reacted by enabling big new defence funds while the future coalition partners rushed changes to the debt brake, to allow more defence spending through in the last days of the soon-to-be-replaced German parliament. And the existence of new EU programmes has given the UK an even bigger incentive to agree a defence and security pact, so that UK-based businesses can bid for European contracts.
But it has also meant that Keir Starmer has been working with President Macron to come up with plans to try to stop the US simply walking away from Ukraine. As the two major military powers in western Europe, they have been co-ordinating meetings of their “coalition of the willing” with the aim of providing some sort of guarantees of a post-ceasefire peace in Ukraine, in the hope that might persuade the US to stay engaged in some form beyond sending in the mineral extractors. Thus far, they appear to have kept the US on board, but Washington seems to have a far greater predilection for talking directly to Moscow than seeing this as any sort of joint endeavour with the Europeans. The risk is they are sidelined – or their bluff is called, and they are forced to make good on their rhetorical support for Ukraine with the US absent.
The calculation changes when it comes to trade policy. The UK has quietly welcomed that it has not been caught by the “reciprocal” 20 per cent tariff still hanging over the head of the EU – though this is simply a product of the Trump formula, not diplomatic skill. But while the UK seems to be recognising that it is unlikely to force the US to back down on its 10 per cent baseline tariff – imposed near universally as a revenue raiser – it is keen to see whether it can seal a deal to reduce or remove the sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminium and most crucially cars and, potentially, pharmaceuticals.
But here Starmer may find his bridge is more akin to a tightrope. A deal that sees the UK row back on tech regulation or drop agricultural standards could stymie the EU trade reset and make defence co-operation harder. Brussels is watching closely for what the UK may offer. And an EU reset that sees the UK dynamically align with EU veterinary standards, which the US regards as aimed at keeping out its agricultural exports, could cause Trump to lash out at the UK.
Starmer has so far refused to choose between the US and Europe, accommodating and flattering the US President, while mending fences with Macron and Ursula von der Leyen. The next month will show whether he can deliver a double win – or has risked alienating both sides.
Jill Rutter writes as a senior research fellow at UK in a Changing Europe
