Putin is closer to breaking Ukraine than Britain’s brave talk admits
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4 min read
At the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Atlanta on 30 October, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband confronted his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, and told him that Russia was not winning the war.
During his visit to Ukraine in early October, Miliband’s message to Vladimir Putin was similarly defiant: “You cannot wait us out.” Foreign policy requires delivering high-level messages of intent to other parties. The challenge is to make them credible.
True, the war has not gone well for Putin.
The Russian economy is under increasing pressure, but it is very far from the point where it is going to collapse. The Kremlin has no reason to believe that it cannot continue current levels of defence spending for at least another two years.
Ukraine’s impressive air campaign deep inside Russia has taken the authorities by surprise. Yet the attacks are not happening at a scale that is damaging the economy to the point where the Kremlin feels it necessary to negotiate an end to the war.
The staggering level of Russia’s war casualties – around 400,000 soldiers killed and close to a million injured – has not made society question the war. Recruiting soldiers is becoming harder. Yet for now, the authorities are coping, including by forcing conscripts to sign contracts that oblige them to fight in Ukraine.
Even if Putin will not ultimately succeed in returning Ukraine to the Russian fold, he can still inflict such a high level of damage on the country that it will struggle to develop and be a huge long-term burden for Europe.
For now, the Russian army remains unable to break through in Donbas thanks to heroic resistance by heavily outnumbered Ukrainian forces.
The tactical successes of the Ukrainian army can create a misleading picture. Putin is now fighting the war at a different level. He has switched to destroying Ukraine’s economy. Russian drones and missiles are targeting power generation and heating systems, water supplies, railways and bridges. This summer, attacks intensified on Ukraine’s steel industry to the point where production has ceased entirely.
Russia is producing and launching increasing numbers of ballistic missiles against which Ukraine has almost zero defences because of the global shortage of Patriot interceptors.
In Putin’s mind, this strategy of targeting Ukraine’s economy serves the dual purpose of depriving the Ukrainian state of the revenues it needs to continue the war while placing an increasingly heavy burden on Kyiv’s European allies to plug the growing hole in its budget.
Putin is now fighting the war at a different level
Talking to senior Foreign Office (FCDO) officials, one can easily be lulled into a false sense of security about the state of the war. The FCDO corporate view is that Putin is under pressure to the point where he will come to the table next year and it will be possible to conclude a ceasefire by freezing the front line and underpinning Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence with far-reaching security assurances (not guarantees).
This thinking is far too optimistic. Putin senses that victory is imminent if he carries on as now. There is no immediate sign that he can achieve his goal of creating a budget crisis leading to a currency crisis and a bank run, but the pressure is growing. Ukraine desperately requires long-term financing far beyond today’s levels.
Keeping Ukraine in the fight and putting more pressure on the Kremlin to change course is going to require political courage on the part of European leaders to take the message to their electorates to persuade them that stopping Putin in Ukraine is an investment in Europe’s security as a whole. Putin may not want to invade other European countries at this stage, but he is determined to establish a European security system that benefits Russia by making its neighbours feel less secure.
Breaking Ukraine is the first step in this process, and Putin is closer to this goal than many politicians either know or would like to admit.
John Lough is Head of foreign policy at New Eurasian Strategies Centre