Uncharted Waters: The Dangers - And Opportunities - Of Russia's High North
Illustration by Tracy Worrall
8 min read
The Northern Sea Route through Arctic waters promises dramatically cheaper shipping between Asia and Europe. Ros Taylor asks if the UK can assert ships’ rights to transit under international law without playing into Vladimir Putin’s hands.
Five hundred years ago, a Russian diplomat suggested that it might be possible to travel from northern Europe to China via the Arctic. It is indeed possible – but it has never been easy.
Known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the journey takes a fortnight less than travelling via the Strait of Hormuz, saving on both fuel and crew costs. The ships that use it are overwhelmingly Russian, and there are excellent reasons why: the ice, the lack of ports in an emergency and the fact that most of the route is controlled by Vladimir Putin.
Now, the world is warming. By the late 2030s, the NSR will be less icy and should be an attractive alternative for shipping companies that want to avoid instability in the Middle East.
Russia is already using it to ship millions of barrels of oil to Asia to avoid sanctions, and it has recently allowed Chinese and South Korean vessels to use the route. Traffic in 2026 is expected to be 10 per cent higher than last year, at around 40m metric tons. So why not try to establish whether the route is viable for European shipping?
That was the top recommendation of the Commons Defence Select Committee in its report last month on Britain and the High North. It said the government “should prepare options for a UK state-owned vessel to transit the Northern Sea Route in support of international freedom of navigation rights”. The aim is, quite literally, to test the waters.
The committee acknowledges the UK would need to plan for the legal and operational risks, as well as the biggest unknown – which is how Russia would react. Putin does, after all, consider himself to be at war with the UK. So is this proposal really about establishing a shipping route, or is it a way to project British military power? And could it end up playing into Russia’s hands?
The government is due to respond to the report by Christmas, and the Ministry of Defence did not reply when approached for comment for this article. But Marc De Vore, a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of St Andrews, suggests sending RRS Sir David Attenborough, a polar research ship, or RFA Proteus, a multi-role ocean surveillance ship. Both can sail in extreme environments. “Ensure it was in tip-top shape and sail it in August or September, when the sea ice is minimal.”
He says that Russia is already planning to turn the NSR into the equivalent of the Suez Canal, “a route that Russia would control and would charge money to use”. The disruption to the Strait of Hormuz has made shipping companies more open to alternative passages. Vessels that now use the NSR rely on Russian underwriters. De Vore argues that if we can establish that European vessels are not able to transit it, insurers like Lloyd’s are much less likely to insure ships on the NSR. That would make it harder for Russia to exploit it and charge tolls.
Not everyone agrees. What if Russia lets the ship proceed unhindered? Ed Arnold is the advisory director for defence and national security at the membership organisation, the D Group. He says Russia knows the West is tiring of the war in Ukraine, and it is looking for a chance to be accepted back into the international community. The NSR represents just such an opportunity, and the Russian economy would benefit from tolls. “What if you have a successful transit, we all get used to it and it’s suddenly shut off by the Russians? Why would you rely on it?”
Then Britain needs to consider the possibility that the ship (or any Royal Navy vessel that escorted it) developed a fault, which is not uncommon in the freezing Arctic. “It’d be extremely ignominious to have a British warship that needed urgent maintenance and had to go to a Russian port,” says David Blagden, associate professor of international security and strategy at the University of Exeter. The Ministry of Defence is not going to share pictures of the David Attenborough limping into Murmansk, but Putin would enjoy it.
On the other hand, Putin might decide to disrupt or detain the ship as payback for Britain having done the same to Russian ships in UK waters. That is when the problems could start. The government would not want to see Britons being taken into custody. “If there was an escalation and you needed to do something on the military side, that’s quite risky if it leads to a potential direct escalation with Russia,” says Blagden. He adds that while Russia’s ground forces in Ukraine and the Black Sea fleet are unimpressive, “the Northern Fleet get the best sailors, the best resources”.
Also, what options are in place, Blagden asks, should a British vessel be militarily harassed? “Having RAF fighter aircraft in north Norway and western Canada, or whether you’d want to do it at a time when you had a hunter-killer submarine at sea?” It is not difficult to imagine a scenario akin to the one in Sky’s recent The Wargame, which did not go well.
“The Ministry of Defence is not going to share pictures of the David Attenborough limping into Murmansk, but Putin would enjoy it”
That is why Arnold predicts that if Britain does plan a crossing, the threat of escalation will give pause to our allies in the High North, like Norway and Finland. They do not want to provoke Russia unnecessarily. And while De Vore argues that, in the region, only Britain has the necessary heft and credibility to carry out an operation like this, the fact is that our navy is already overstretched.
The Royal Navy is in a “dire, abject position”, says Blagden. “It’s absolutely on its bones. Successive governments have dithered about investing in maintenance.” Submarines, destroyers and frigates regularly go out of service and are not replaced. Britain’s ability to operate subs under ice is in question. It last carried out an under-sea exercise back in 2018, and the one remaining Trafalgar-class sub known to have under-ice capability was taken out of service last year. In the event of war, this means Russia can keep some of its fleet of ballistic missile submarines hidden under the ice in the High North, while others go out to attack Nato sea lanes and targets in Britain.
Blagden says the Chancellor, John Healey, will have seen the briefings about Russian activity in the High North when he was defence secretary, “only tiny bits of which filter through to the public”, but there is still a “disconnect” between the Treasury and the MoD. “Even if you turn the money on, the frigate factories are at full capacity.” The new Type 26 frigate was ordered in 2015 and is unlikely to be in service until 2028. Britain has successfully exported some of them, but fulfilling foreign orders has slowed down the delivery of our own ships.
Defence experts are much more confident about the Royal Marines. “The Russians are terribly impressed with the Arctic capabilities of our Royal Marines special forces, and they comment on that,” Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, professor of war studies at Loughborough University, told the High North committee inquiry. The kit is the problem, and it cannot be replaced quickly.
In short, sending a British ship through the NSR is “quite risky”, says Arnold. America can no longer be relied upon to come to the aid of Nato allies, despite Donald Trump’s interest in Greenland. “When it comes to the High North, the UK is the major power now. The American cavalry is not about to ride over the horizon and save our fecklessness,” Blagden told the inquiry. There is no question of trying to take the Russians by surprise, as France apparently did when it made a similar transit in 2018 that may have gone undetected. “It’s going to be telegraphed... The whole point is to show international allies you’re not scared and the route remains open.”
De Vore thinks that is exactly why it should be tried. If Russia did push back, he says, Britain still has tools at its disposal. Many big shipping insurers are based in London and Rotterdam: we could ban them from insuring any ships that transited the High North. “It does strike me that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks, and we have to price in the cost of inaction.”
But as any defence expert will tell you, the British public is largely oblivious to any threat in the High North. The last time most people thought about the region was during the Cod Wars with Iceland, half a century ago. “Part of it is the southeastern-centrism of the UK – Europe, the Channel, small boats,” says Blagden. “People forget that parts of the UK are north of parts of Greenland.”
For the Royal Navy’s submarine community, on the other hand, “the High North never stopped being where it all happened”, even when relations with Russia relaxed after the Cold War. Crossing these perilous waters is a chance for the UK to project our strength. But it could lure the UK into very deep waters – and even the experts cannot agree on what a successful operation would look like.