The Professor Will See You Now: Shadows
Illustration by Tracy Worrall
4 min read
Lessons in political science. This week: shadows
The marking of student essays has, over many years and at multiple institutions, revealed the existence of two otherwise unknown prime ministers: a Mr “MacMillan” and a Mr “Atlee”. Students everywhere get those two wrong, for reasons that are not entirely clear.
Given that there is a statue of Attlee on our main campus – his 1945 constituency result was declared in the university’s Great Hall – there really is no excuse for a Queen Mary student to be getting the spelling of his name wrong, although recently a student standing in front of the statue was heard to ask who it was, only to be told (by another) that he was “some sort of activist”. D-; see me after class.
Of his many achievements, relatively few know that Attlee was responsible for creating the modern system of opposition frontbench portfolios. Previously, frontbench duties outside of government been much more loosely organised, but in 1955 Attlee gave frontbenchers specific portfolios to shadow, and included MPs outside of the shadow cabinet, creating a larger and much more formalised alternative government.
This development was not universally welcomed. As Nigel Fletcher notes in his history of the official opposition, Institutionalised Dissent, it was seen as self-aggrandisement by the Labour Party, with one MP likening it to putting “paper crowns on the heads of little tin gods”.
A fascinating new piece of research in Government and Opposition looks at how many of the alternative government end up in actual government. How many go on to wear real crowns?
The researchers identify two measures: personal continuity (whether an opposition frontbencher transitions into government after an election victory) and portfolio continuity (whether they transition into the same role).
However measured, there’s been less continuity than I had expected. Taking the seven wholescale changes of government since 1964, around four-fifths of opposition frontbenchers were appointed to government, but only roughly half kept the same portfolio they had shadowed. (These figures exclude whips; Lords ministers; the PM him or herself; and they take a generous interpretation of cases where someone’s portfolio is split).
Of his many achievements, relatively few know that Attlee was responsible for creating the modern system of opposition frontbench portfolios
Both types of continuity were highest in 1979, when 95 per cent of Margaret Thatcher’s final frontbench team made it into government, 61 per cent of going into the same role, but even here it means around four out of 10 frontbenchers ended up in a different job to the one they had shadowed.
With just seven changes of party between 1964 and 2024, we have a classic low-N problem, making it difficult to say too much about why some of these differences occur. Some are clearly just the idiosyncratic decisions of prime ministers, while in other cases the electorate insert a spoke in the wheel, as with Teddy Taylor in 1979 or Jonathan Ashworth and Thangam Debbonaire in 2024. (It is, I think, the most telling fact about the nature of Labour’s support in 2024 that the party managed to lose two members of the shadow cabinet while winning a landslide). But the electorate’s role was at its most consequential in 2010 where the Coalition resulted in Cameron’s shadow team experiencing very low levels of both personal and portfolio continuity. Not all of them took it well.
Shadow cabinet ministers seem more likely to hold on to their post, as are those with prior ministerial experience and those who have been in post longer; the lower ranks and the less experienced get shuffled more. Being a supporter of the PM does not appear to make much of a difference.
The authors also show that the number of little tin gods has increased. Margaret Thatcher’s shadow team in the Commons numbered 43; by the time Tony Blair replaced John Major, Labour’s numbered 82. Keir Starmer had 91. You may be thinking that it is not immediately obvious that the increase in the size of the opposition frontbench has coincided with an improvement in the quality of governance.
Further reading: N Fletcher, Institutionalised Dissent: The Official Opposition in the UK since 1935 (2024); N Allen and J Bartle, When Do Shadow Ministers Become ‘Realities’? Evidence from the UK, 1964–2024, Government and Opposition (2026)